heinekingmedia StashCat Cryptographic Issues

Karsten-Kai KAPnig

1. Introduction

* Product: heinekingmedia StashCat
* Status: Patch available
* Affected versions:
* Android: <= 1.7.5
* Web: <= 0.0.80w
* Desktop <= 0.0.86
* Vendor-URL: https://www.stashcat.com/
* CVE: CVE-2017-11129 bis CVE-2017-11136

During an independent investigation researchers of CIPHRON found
vulnerabilities in cryptographic and security functions of the instant
menssenger StashCat of heinekingmedia GmbH.

CIPHRON follows the principle of responsible disclosure and has informed
heinekingmedia beforehand. heinekindmedia has reacted to the disclosure
and has developed patches. These patches are available and will be
distributed in successive.

CIPHRON follows an own disclosure policy. This is available at


2. Description of software

StashCat is developed by heinekingmedia GmbH and has the aim to give
customers an instant messenger which encrypts the communication between
clients End-to-End like it is known, for example, from WhatsApp or
Telegram. It is worth mentioning that the messenger provides a web and a
desktop client in addition to the Android and iOS app.

According to heinekingmedia the messenger aims especially at the use by
the police and authorities.

More information are available at


According to the web client website at


we investigated version v0.0.80w

The investigated Android versions were the versions 1.5.18 and 1.7.5.

According to the installation file we investigated the version 0.0.86 of
the desktop client.

3. Description of vulnerabilities

The vulnerabilities were found during a half-day code review of the web
client. This was possible because the client is written in angular and
the client-side JavaScript code is directly available on


The desktop client is build with Electron and is based on the web client
code for the base functionality.

We found vulnerabilities in the Android app via reverse engineering,
too. The finding from the code review of the web client were verified
through the reverse engineering if the protocol is affected.

The vulnerabilities have assigned CVEs. These are CVE-2017-11129 to

CIPHRON has asked an independent third party, the Niedersachsen-CERT
(N-CERT), to verify the findings, what they did.

We gave heinekingmedia the change to comment the findings.

3.1 Communication decryptable through vendor


One can see that the private key of the RSA-key pair, which is created
on the clients and is used to exchange passwords for symmetric
encryption of the communication channel, is transmitted to the

The password which is used to encrypt the private key are the first 32
bytes of the SHA512 hash of the user passsword. But this is transmitted
to the vendor server, too, as it is the login password.

This allows to decrypt the private key of StashCat users and therefore
the formaly encrypted communication channel for everyone which has
access to the vendor server because the password for the symmetric
encryption can be eavesdropped.

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

Passwords to secure the private key are now independent of the used
account password.

RSA keys are now 4096 bit in addition.

3.2 No key derivation function used


Instead of using a key deriviation function to create the password for
authentication, the user password is hashed directly with SHA512.
Moreover, only the first 32 bytes are used. State-of-the-art is to use a
key derivation function like PBKDF2 to generate from a source of low
entropy a password with high entropy.

Moreover, rainbow table attacks are mitigated through this

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

RSA-keys are encrypted according to PKCS#8. PBKDF2 is used internally.

3.3 Passwords generated with math.random()


The communication ist encrypted with AES in CBC-mode. The passwords to
encrypt the communication channel and the IV which are exchanged by the
communicating parties with RSA-key pairs are generated with math.random.

Newer versions are using CryptoJS.lib.WordArray.random() which uses
math.random() internal as well. This method ist not secure in a
cryptographic sense. Instead such generated passwords have to be treated
as deterministic what could lead to a compromise of the communication

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

Channel and conversation secrets are are no longer generated by

3.4 Integrity and authenticity not ensured


The integrity and authenticity of encrypted messages is not ensured.
This allows, for example, replay attacks in man-in-the-middle scenarios.

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

Responses created by the server are signed and can be verified by the
public key of the server.

3.5 Logout without authorisation


Logouts of users can be done without authorisation because only the
device ID is needed.

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

The logout needs only the device_id. This is intentional and leads to
the deletion of of data on the logouted device.

This is by no means a vulnerability.

__Remark of CIPHRON__

From our point of view this can lead to a problem if an attacker could
enumerate all device IDs. This could be used for a denial of service

3.6 Android-keystore uses hard coded password

The Android-keystore uses a hard coded password. This allows to read out
contained passwords through third parties which gained access to the

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

A hard coded password is not used from now on.

The previously hard coded password for the Android-keystore is now
replaced by a randomly generated password. The password is created by a
random string of 32 characters which is generated by a secure random
method. The random string is stored in the shared preferences of Android
and is deleted with every logout. The stored random string is XORed with
the manufacture and model code of the device. The result is used as the
encryption key. From this the keystore password is derived in
conjuncture with the device ID.

3.7 No certificate pinning


The Android-app uses no certificate pinning. Instead, only the signature
of the Certificate Authority is checked. This eases man-in-the-middle

Remark: This finding was fixed independently of the disclosure process
in Android-versions after 1.5.18.

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

All apps use certificate pinning or HPKP to complicate man-in-the-middle

3.8 Login data in the logs


The Android-app saves login data in the logs what could help attackers
to gain access to this data.

__Comment of heinekingmedia__

In the case of exceptions the request was saved to the log on the

The log entries are now cleared beforehand.

4. Solution

heinekingmedia has accepted the findings and will distribute patches
successively which are already available.

5. Credits

The code review and the reverse engineering was done by Karsten KAPnig of
CIPHRON. Sebastian Horzela and Lennart Henke supported.

The Niedersachen-CERT verified the findings of CIPHRON as an independent

6. Greets

Greets to the team of CIPHRON, especially Martin, Jan and Frithjof for
the good discussions and the good atmosphere in the office.

7. Timeline

10.03.2017 Vendor contacted

15.03.2017 Second contact attempt because no response received

15.03.2017 Phone call with heinekingmedia

15.03.2017 Findings communicated

06.06.2017 Note that findings are solved

28.06.2017 Communication of the prepared advisory for coordination

11.07.2017 Advisory communicated to N-CERT because CIPHRON received no

17.07.2017 Coordination with heinekingmedia about further procedure

18.07.2017 Commentary of the vendor about the findings received by

19.07.2017 Remarks about the commentary communication to heinekingmedia

19.07.2017 Communication of the updated advisory draft including the

19.07.2017 Coordindation of the advisory publication

19.07.2017 Note that the findings will be fixed until the end of next

28.07.2017 Note that patches of the findings are ready

28.07.2017 Discussion of the patches

31.07.2017 Publication of the advisory

8. About CIPHRON

The CIPHRON GmbH was founded in 2003 and is a consultancy for
information security with its central office in Hannover, Germany. As a
consultancy for information security, CIPHRON does penetration tests,
code reviews and individual research about security topics.

More information are available at


Karsten-Kai KAPnig, IT Security Consultant

Tel.: +49 (5 11) 51 51 33 - 0 Fax: +49 (5 11) 51 51 33 - 29
Web: http://www.ciphron.de/ Support: +49 (5 11) 51 51 33 - 11

Ust.Id.: DE263362886 GeschA$?ftsfA1/4hrer: Sebastian Horzela
Amtsgericht Hannover, HRB 203590Dear

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