I. BACKGROUND Aerohive Networks HiveManager Classic Online NMS is a cloud-enabled enterprise-class management system for Aerohive networking products. HiveManager Classic Online offers simple policy creation, firmware upgrades, and centralized monitoring of thousands of Aerohive access points, switches, and branch routers. Responsible disclosure with Aerohive: Aerohive has a very reactive security staff. Their response to our communication was pretty fast, we received the first ack within 24hrs and an official statement in 4days. The latest version of the software at the time of writing can be obtained from support portal at https://support.aerohive.com/login II. DESCRIPTION The vulnerability allows a local user, even restricted as a Tenant, to upload a backup archive that contain jsp webshell, therefore to execute code on underlying system. The affected component is Backup Archive Handler. III. ANALYSIS The HiveManager Classic backup is a plain .tar.gz file with a very simple structure. Once the archive is extracted, you will see two folders: - HiveManager - dbxmlfile "dbxmlfile/" contains the HM/VHM configuration, an interesting file to work on. Anyway our interest moved to "HiveManager/" as it contains a directory named "tomcat/webapps" which is the default Tomcat web app. The full tree is something like: aa tomcat aaa webapps aaa hm aaa domains aaa MyTenant aaa maps aaa ca.png aaa campus.png aaa map_floorplan.png aaa us.png aaa world.png If such directory is tampered, tar gzipped and then restored using the backup/restore functionality, an attacker can gain code execution on the system. As Proof of Concept a "webshell.jsp" file has been added at maps/ level, then we created a new .tar.gz archive and tried to restore it. No error has been thrown and jsp file was available under the docroot at URI /hm/domains/MyTenant/maps/ Further analysis pointed out that full path was writable so it's possible to upload a jsp shell even outside the Tenant scope. Code will be executed as tomcat (uid/gid 501) allowing a full compromise of the web UI and access to other Tenant files and configurations as well. IV. WORKAROUND We are not aware of any workaround. VI. VENDOR RESPONSE Vendor is moving to a completely new release of the product called HiveManager-NG, which has a different architecture and is not affected by this vulnerability. We did not perform any audit on such version of the product. VII. CVE INFORMATION Mitre assigned the CVE-2017-14105 for this vulnerability. VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE 20170828 Bug discovered 20170829 Vulnerability disclosed to Aerohive 20170829 First reply from Aerohive 20170901 The vendor reply with a wontfix 20170901 Request for CVE to Mitre 20170901 Got CVE-2017-14105 from cve-assign 20170902 Full disclosure IX. REFERENCES https://github.com/theguly/CVE-2017-14105 taste your favourite IT consultant