########################################################################### ______ ____________ __ / ____/_ __/ / __/_ __/__ _____/ /_ / / __/ / / / / /_ / / / _ \/ ___/ __ \ / /_/ / /_/ / / __/ / / / __/ /__/ / / / \____/\__,_/_/_/ /_/ \___/\___/_/ /_/ GulfTech Research and Development ########################################################################### # WDMyCloud <= 2.30.165 Multiple Vulnerabilities # ########################################################################### Released Date: 2018-01-04 Last Modified: 2017-06-11 Company Info: Western Digital Version Info: Vulnerable MyCloud <= 2.30.165 MyCloudMirror <= 2.30.165 My Cloud Gen 2 My Cloud PR2100 My Cloud PR4100 My Cloud EX2 Ultra My Cloud EX2 My Cloud EX4 My Cloud EX2100 My Cloud EX4100 My Cloud DL2100 My Cloud DL4100 Not Vulnerable MyCloud 04.X Series --[ Table of contents 00 - Introduction 00.1 Background 01 - Unrestricted file upload 01.1 - Vulnerable code analysis 01.2 - Remote exploitation 02 - Hard coded backdoor 02.1 - Vulnerable code analysis 02.2 - Remote exploitation 03 - Miscellaneous security issues 03.1 - Cross site request forgery 03.2 - Command injection 03.3 - Denial of service 03.4 - Information disclosure 04 - Reused Code 05 - Credit 06 - Proof of concept 07 - Disclosure timeline 08 - Solution 09 - Contact information 10 - References --[ 00 - Introduction The purpose of this article is to detail the research that I have completed regarding the Western Digital MyCloud family of devices. Several serious security issues were uncovered during my research. Vulnerabilities such as pre auth remote root code execution, as well as a hardcoded backdoor admin account which can NOT be changed. The backdoor also allows for pre auth remote root code execution on the affected device. The research was conducted on both a WDMyCloud 4TB and a WDMyCloudMirror 16TB with the latest available firmware 2.30.165. My research shows that the 04 branch of the WDMyCloud firmware is not vulnerable to these issues. --[ 00.1 - Background WD My Cloud is a personal cloud storage unit to organize your photos and videos. It is currently the best selling NAS (network attached storage) device listed on the amazon.com website, and is used by individuals and businesses alike. It's purpose is to host your files, and it also has the ability to sync them with various cloud and web based services. --[ 01 - Unrestricted file upload The WDMyCloud device is vulnerable to an unrestricted file upload vulnerability within the following file: /usr/local/modules/web/pages/jquery/uploader/multi_uploadify.php The root of the problem here is due to the misuse and misunderstanding of the PHP gethostbyaddr() function used within PHP, by the developer of this particular piece of code. From the PHP manual this functions return values are defined as the following for gethostbyaddr(): "Returns the host name on success, the unmodified ip_address on failure, or FALSE on malformed input." With a brief overview of the problem, let's have a look at the offending code in order to get a better understanding of what is going on with this particular vulnerability. --[ 01.1 - Vulnerable code analysis Below is the code from the vulnerable "multi_uploadify.php" script. You can see that I have annoted the code to explain what is happening. #BUG 01: Here the attacker controlled "Host" header is used to define the remote auth server. This is by itself really bad, as an attacker could easily just specify that the host be the IP address of a server that they are in control of. But, if we send it an invalid "Host" header it will just simply return FALSE as defined in the PHP manual. $ip = gethostbyaddr($_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']); $name = $_REQUEST['name']; $pwd = $_REQUEST['pwd']; $redirect_uri = $_REQUEST['redirect_uri']; //echo $name ."<br>".$pwd."<br>".$ip; #BUG 02: At this point, this request should always fail. The $result variable should now be set to FALSE. $result = @stripslashes( @join( @file( "http://".$ip."/mydlink/mydlink.cgi? cmd=1&name=".$name."=&pwd=".$pwd ),"" )); #BUG 03: Here an empty haystack is searched, and thus strstr() returns a value of FALSE. $result_1 = strstr($result,"<auth_status>0</auth_status>"); $result_1 = substr ($result_1, 0,28); #BUG 04: The strncmp() call here is a strange one. It looks for a specific login failure. So, it never accounts for when things go wrong or slightly unexpected. As a result this "if" statement will always be skipped. if (strncmp ($result_1,"<auth_status>0</auth_status>",28) == 0 ) //if (strstr($result,"<auth_status>0</auth_status>")== 0 ) { header("HTTP/1.1 302 Found"); header("Location: ".$redirect_uri."?status=0"); exit(); } #BUG 05: At this point all checks have been passed, and an attacker can use this issue to upload any file to the server that they want. The rest of the source code was omitted for the sake of breivity, but it just handles the file upload logic once the user passes the authentication checks. --[ 01.2 - Remote exploitation Exploiting this issue to gain a remote shell as root is a rather trivial process. All an attacker has to do is send a post request that contains a file to upload using the parameter "Filedata[0]", a location for the file to be upload to which is specified within the "folder" parameter, and of course a bogus "Host" header. I have written a Metasploit module to exploit this issue. The module will use this vulnerability to upload a PHP webshell to the "/var/www/" directory. Once uploaded, the webshell can be executed by requesting a URI pointing to the backdoor, and thus triggering the payload. --[ 02 - Hard coded backdoor After finding the previously mentioned file upload vulnerability I decided to switch gears and start reversing the CGI binaries that were accessable via the web interface. The CGI binaries are standard Linux ELF executables and pretty easy to go through. Within an hour of starting I stumbled across the following file located at: /usr/local/modules/cgi/nas_sharing.cgi The above file can be accessed by visiting "/cgi-bin/nas_sharing.cgi" but it produces server errors with every single method, except when the "cmd" parameter was set to "7". This piqued my interest and so I really started digging into the binary, as it seemed very buggy and possibly vulnerable. As it turns out the error was caused due to buggy code and nothing I was or wasn't doing wrong. But, while I was figuring out the cause of the error I happened to come across the following function that is used to authenticate the remote user. --[ 02.1 - Vulnerable code analysis Below is the psuedocode created from the disassembly of the binary. I have renamed the function to "re_BACKDOOR" to visually identify it more easily. struct passwd *__fastcall re_BACKDOOR(const char *a1, const char *a2) { const char *v2; // r5@1 const char *v3; // r4@1 struct passwd *result; // r0@4 FILE *v5; // r6@5 struct passwd *v6; // r5@7 const char *v7; // r0@9 size_t v8; // r0@10 int v9; // [sp+0h] [bp-1090h]@1 char s; // [sp+1000h] [bp-90h]@1 char dest; // [sp+1040h] [bp-50h]@1 v2 = a2; v3 = a1; memset(&s, 0, 0x40u); memset(&dest, 0, 0x40u); memset(&v9, 0, 0x1000u); if ( *v2 ) { v8 = strlen(v2); _b64_pton(v2, (u_char *)&v9, v8); if ( dword_2C2E4 ) { sub_1194C((const char *)&unk_1B1A4, v2); sub_1194C("pwd decode[%s]\n", &v9); } } if (!strcmp(v3, "mydlinkBRionyg") && !strcmp((const char *)&v9, "abc12345cba") ) { result = (struct passwd *)1; } else { v5 = (FILE *)fopen64("/etc/shadow", "r"); while ( 1 ) { result = fgetpwent(v5); v6 = result; if ( !result ) break; if ( !strcmp(result->pw_name, v3) ) { strcpy(&s, v6->pw_passwd); fclose(v5); strcpy(&dest, (const char *)&v9); v7 = (const char *)sub_1603C(&dest, &s); return (struct passwd *)(strcmp(v7, &s) == 0); } } } return result; } As you can see in the above code, the login functionality specifically looks for an admin user named "mydlinkBRionyg" and will accept the password of "abc12345cba" if found. This is a classic backdoor. Simply login with the credentials that I just mentioned from the above code. Also, it is peculiar that the username is "mydlinkBRionyg", and that the vulnerability in Section 1 of this paper refers to a non existent file name of "mydlink.cgi" but, more about that later in section 4... --[ 02.2 - Remote exploitation At first, to the untrained eye, exploiting this backdoor to do useful things may seem problematic due to the fact that only method "7" gives us no error. And, method 7 only allows us the ability to download any files in "/mnt/", but no root shell. But, we want a root shell. Right? After digging deeper I realized that the CGI script was dying every time, but only at the final rendering phase due to what seems like an error where the programmer forgot to specify the content type header on output, thus confusing the webserver and causing the crash. So, everything we do gets executed up until that point successfully. It is just blind execution. Now that I had that figured out I started looking for a method I could then exploit to gain shell access. I started with method "51" because it was the first one I looked at. This particular method happened to contain a command injection issue. Now I easily could turn this backdoor into a root shell, and gain control of the affected device. GET /cgi-bin/nas_sharing.cgi?dbg=1&cmd=51&user=mydlinkBRionyg&passwd=YWJjMT IzNDVjYmE&start=1&count=1;touch+/tmp/gulftech; HTTP/1.1 By sending a request like the one above a remote attacker could now execute any commands as root. And yes, the password is base64 encoded, as that is what the script expects. In the example above I simply create a file called "gulftech" located in the "/tmp/" directory. The triviality of exploiting this issues makes it very dangerous, and even wormable. Not only that, but users locked to a LAN are not safe either. An attacker could literally take over your WDMyCloud by just having you visit a website where an embedded iframe or img tag make a request to the vulnerable device using one of the many predictable default hostnames for the WDMyCloud such as "wdmycloud" and "wdmycloudmirror" etc. <img src="http://wdmycloud/cgi-bin/nas_sharing.cgi?dbg=1&cmd=51&user=mydlin kBRionyg&passwd=YWJjMTIzNDVjYmE&start=1&count=1;rm+-rf+/;"> For example simply visiting the above link will totally destroy a WDMyCloud without the need for any type of authentication whatsoever, and there is nothing you can do about it except delete the file as the credentials are hardcoded into the binary itself. --[ 03 - Miscellaneous vulnerabilities In addition to the two previously mentioned critical vulnerabilities were also several other issues. These other issues are still very dangerous, but require authentication in some cases, and for the most part are not considered as critical, and also require less technical explanation. --[ 03.1 - Cross site request forgery There is no real XSRF protection within the WDMyCloud web interface. This can have quite the impact on unsuspecting users. Exploitation of this issue is trivial. http://wdmycloud/web/dsdk/DsdkProxy.php?;rm -rf /; For example, if a logged in WDMyCloud admin visits, or is forced to visit the above link, then the entire device will be wiped out. This is just one of many XSRF issues. We do not have time to track them all down. --[ 03.2 - Command injection Some time ago, a researcher from the "Exploiteers" team found an alarming number of command injection issues within the WDMyCloud. Unfortunately, we were able to find quite a few as well. class RemoteBackupsAPI{ public function getRecoverItems() { $xmlPath = "/var/www/xml/rsync_recover_items.xml"; $jobName = $_REQUEST['jobName']; @unlink($xmlPath); $cmd = "rsyncmd -l \"$xmlPath\" -r \"$jobName\" >/dev/null"; system($cmd); if (file_exists($xmlPath)) { print file_get_contents($xmlPath); } else { print "<config></config>"; } } } The above code is an example of the type of command injection issues that still plague the WDMyCloud. This particular command injection is post auth, as were all of the other command injections I found too. However, I did not have time to sift through looking for all of these. And by now I feel that the manufacturer should know better considering they just went through the process of patching many command injection vulnerabilities disclosed by the Exploiteers.[1] --[ 03.3 - Denial of service It is possible for an attacker to abuse language preferences functionality in order to cause a DoS to the web interface. This is due to the fact that any unauthenticated user can set the global language preferences for the entire device and all of its users. The psuedocode from the disassembled binary can be seen below. int cgi_language() { int v1; // [sp+0h] [bp-10h]@1 cgiFormString("f_language", &v1, 8); xml_set_str((int)"/language", (int)&v1); xml_write_file("/etc/NAS_CFG/config.xml"); LIB_CP_Config_To_MTD(1); cgiHeaderContentType("text/html"); return system("language.sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &"); } This is not a very useful attack vector since we only have 8 bytes to work with. But, you can make a script that keeps randomly resetting the language to some random language and it will affect all users of the device and requires no authentication. It is very hard to use the device if it is rendering all of the pages in a language you can not understand. http://wdmycloud/cgi-bin/login_mgr.cgi?cmd=cgi_language&f_language=7 The above example request sets the language to korean. There are 17 available language codes. Details can be found in language.sh located on the target device. --[ 03.4 - Information disclosure It is possible for an attacker to dump a list of all users, including detailed user information. GET /api/2.1/rest/users? HTTP/1.1 Making a simple request to the webserver like the one above will dump the user information to an attacker for all users. This does not require any authentication in order to take advantage of. --[ 04 - D-Link DNS-320L ShareCenter As I have mentioned earlier in this article, I found it peculiar that the username used for the backdoor is "mydlinkBRionyg", and that the vulnerability in Section 1 of this paper refers to a non existent file name of "mydlink.cgi". This really piqued my curiosity, and so I started using google to try to track down some leads. After searching for the term of "mydlink.cgi" I came across a reference to a post made by a D-Link user regarding their D-Link DNS-320L ShareCenter NAS device.[2] Within that post were references to file names and directory structure that were fairly unique, and from the D-link device. But, they also perfectly matched my WDMyCloud device. The more I looked into this the weirder it seemed. So, I gained access to a D-Link DNS-320L ShareCenter. Once I had it things became pretty clear to me as the D-Link DNS-320L had the same exact hard coded backdoor and same exact file upload vulnerability that was present within the WDMyCloud. So, it seems that the WDMyCloud software shares a large amount of the D-Link DNS-320L code, backdoor and all. There are also other undeniable examples such as misspelled function names and other anomalies that match up within both the WDMyCloud and the D-Link DNS-320L ShareCenter code. It should be noted that unlike the WDMyCloud the D-Link DNS-320L is currently NOT vulnerable to the backdoor and file upload issues, so you should upgrade your DNS-320L firmware as soon as possible as the issues can be leveraged to gain a remote root shell on the DNS-320L if you are not up to date with your device firmware. The backdoor was first removed in the 1.0.6 firmware release. (July 28, 2014) It is interesting to think about how before D-Link updated their software two of the most popular NAS device families in the world, sold by two of the most popular tech companies in the world were both vulnerable at the same time, to the same backdoor for a while. The time frame in which both devices were vulnerable at the same time in the wild was roughly from early 2014 to later in 2014 based on comparing firmware release note dates. --[ 05 - Credit James Bercegay GulfTech Research and Development --[ 06 - Proof of concept We strive to do our part to contribute to the security community. Metasploit modules for issues outlined in this paper can be found online. --[ 07 - Disclosure timeline 2017-06-10 Contacted vendor via web contact form. Assigned case #061117-12088041. 2017-06-12 Support member Gavin referred us to WDC PSIRT. We immediately sent a PGP encrypted copy of our report to WDC PSIRT. 2017-06-13 Recieved confirmation of report from Samuel Brown. 2017-06-16 A period of 90 days is requested by vendor until full disclosure. 2017-12-15 Zenofex posts disclosure of the upload bug independantly of my research [3] 2018-01-03 Public Disclosure --[ 08 - Solution N/A --[ 09 - Contact information Web https://gulftech.org/ Mail security@gulftech.org --[ 10 - References [1] https://blog.exploitee.rs/2017/hacking_wd_mycloud/ [2] http://forums.dlink.com/index.php?topic=65415.0 [3] https://www.exploitee.rs/index.php/Western_Digital_MyCloud Copyright 2018 GulfTech Research and Development. All rights reserved.