Title: Vulnerability Report For Voyant Technologies Sonata Conferencing product
Author: Larry W. Cashdollar, @_larry0
Download Site: http://www.voyanttechnology.com/
Vendor: Voyant Technologies.
Vendor Notified: 2000-10-13
Vendor Contact: firstname.lastname@example.org
Description: Sonata is a teleconferencing solution developed by Voyant Technologies. This advisory concerns the Sonata application server and bridge component of the Sonata package. The application server is an Ultra Sparc 5 running Solaris 2.x as required by Voyant technologies. The bridge is an IBM PC running OS/2 Warp. These hosts are usually built in-house by Voyant personnel and installed at customer locations by a field engineer.
Six vulnerabilities have been found in the application server host and Sonata package, they are categorized below:
Reused default user accounts and passwords.
Easily guessable passwords.
Poor file permissions.
Lack of host hardening.
X console authentication has been disabled.
Hard coded default passwords s0nata.
Sonata v3.x on Solaris 2.x.
Sonata bridge OS/2 Warp.
Export: JSON TEXT XML
I. Application Server, Solaris 2.x
By using available default services on the host an attacker can enumerate accounts. Using this easily obtainable account information combined with poor password selection and weak file permissions a remote attacker can gain root access. The passwords guessed are the default for all installations of Sonata.
By default xhost authentication is disabled allowing a remote attacker to log key strokes and capture screen shots of the X console.
II. Bridging Server, OS/2 Warp.
These default passwords are also re-used on the bridging host (OS/2). Which has telnet enabled for remote administration.
I am not going to detail the exploit because the methods used to access these systems are only the most basic information gathering techniques one would use to audit a host.