Intro: Multiple security related issues were identified in the BMC Remedy + ITAM, versions 7.1.00 and 9.1.02.003 were confirmed to be vulnerable. Issues: 1. Authenticated users can access ITAM forms using forceful browsing, i.e. the forms are not accessible in the ITAM web user interface. The list of available forms in the given ITAM deployment can be found using the following URL: https://${MIDTIERSERVER}/arsys/forms/${ARSERVER}/AR+System+Mid+Tier+Object+List/Default+Admin+View/ 2. Authenticated users can obtain the list of existing ITAM usernames in order to perform password-based attacks against these accounts. The list of forms disclosing usernames can be found at, e.g.: https://${MIDTIERSERVER}/arsys/forms/${ARSERVER}/User/Default+Admin+View1/ https://${MIDTIERSERVER}/arsys/forms/${ARSERVER}/CMF%3AUsers/CreateUsersView/ https://${MIDTIERSERVER}/arsys/forms/${ARSERVER}/CMF%3AUserViewForm/Default+Administrator+View/ https://${MIDTIERSERVER}/arsys/forms/${ARSERVER}/CTM%3APeople/Default+User+View/ 3. Authenticated users are able to obtain plain-text credentials of other ITAM accounts. It is possible to change the input type of the password field in order to reveal its plain-text value. The ITAM forms affected by this issue can be found at, e.g.: https://${MIDTIERSERVER}/arsys/forms/${ARSERVER}/TLS%3APLR-Configuration+Details/Default+Admin+View/ https://${MIDTIERSERVER}/arsys/forms/${ARSERVER}/CMF%3APluginConfiguration/Default+Administrator+View/ Possibly, other ITAM forms suffer from the same issue, however, it has not been confirmed, e.g.: https://${MIDTIERSERVER}/arsys/forms/${ARSERVER}/CAI%3AAppRegistry/Default+Admin+View/ https://${MIDTIERSERVER}/arsys/forms/${ARSERVER}/CMF%3ACloudServicesFulfillment/Administrator/ https://${MIDTIERSERVER}/arsys/forms/${ARSERVER}/CMF%3AOpenStack_UserCredentials/Default+Administrator+View/ https://${MIDTIERSERVER}/arsys/forms/${ARSERVER}/CSM%3AVCM%3AVMwareCredentialStore/Default+Administrator+View/ https://${MIDTIERSERVER}/arsys/forms/${ARSERVER}/CMA%3AConfiguration/Default+Administrator+View/ https://${MIDTIERSERVER}/arsys/forms/${ARSERVER}/AST%3AARServerConnection/Default+Admin+View/ 4. Authenticated users can traverse the filesystem and browse files in the underlying operating system running BMC Remedy + ITAM. Access to the files users are able to view this way is restricted by the privileges of the user which was used to start the ITAM process. The ITAM form affected by this issue can be found at: https://${MIDTIERSERVER}/arsys/forms/${ARSERVER}/AR+System+Administration%3A+Server+Information/Default+Admin+View/ The above issues can be chained together to escalate privileges (horizontally and vertically) in the ITAM application. In some circumstances it is also possible to execute commands in the underlying operating system (e.g. https://communities.bmc.com/thread/61257). Remediation: Contact vendor directly for remediation guidance. Timeline: 05.10.2018: Email asking how to best report vulnerabilities in the BMC products sent to BMC at global_security@bmc.com. 08.10.2018: Attempted to obtain BMC security contact details using social media. 19.10.2018: CERT-CC contacted in order to request their assistance with coordinated disclosure. 30.10.2018: Follow-up email sent to CERT-CC asking for status. 31.10.2018: CERT-CC replied to contact BMC directly using information provided at http://www.bmc.com/corporate/product-security-and-quality.html. 31.10.2018: CVE requested from MITRE. 31.10.2018: MITRE assigned a combined CVE-2018-18862 for the discovered issues. 02.11.2018: Email detailing discovered issues sent to BMC at appsec@bmc.com. 05.11.2018: Follow-up email sent to BMC asking for status. 05.11.2018: BMC confirms receipt of the previous emails and requests more information. 05.11.2018: Email with additional information sent to BMC. 08.11.2018: BMC requests detailed reproduction steps in the form of the pentest report and recommends to use the official support channel. 08.11.2018: BMC was informed that no further details can be provided. 21.11.2018: Follow-up email sent to BMC asking for status. 10.12.2018: Follow-up email sent to BMC informing that the security advisory will be published in the next following weeks. 02.01.2019: The advisory has been released. Cheers, Filip Palian