Vulnerability title: TP-LINK Cloud Cameras NCXXX Remote NULL Pointer Dereference
Author: Pietro Oliva
CVE: CVE-2020-10231
Vendor: TP-LINK
Product: NC200, NC210, NC220, NC230, NC250, NC260, NC450
Affected version: NC200 <= 2.1.8 build 171109, NC210 <= 1.0.9 build 171214,
NC220 <= 1.3.0 build 180105, NC230 <= 1.3.0 build 171205,
NC250 <= 1.3.0 build 171205, NC260 <= 1.5.1 build 190805,
NC450 <= 1.5.0 build 181022
Description:
The issue is located in the httpLoginRpm method of the ipcamera binary (handler
method for /login.fcgi), where after successful login, there is no check for
NULL in the return value of httpGetEnv(environment, "HTTP_USER_AGENT"). Shortly
after that, there is a call to strstr(user_agent_string, "Firefox") and if a
User-Agent header is not specified by the client, httpGetEnv will return NULL,
and a NULL pointer dereference occurs when calling strstr, with consequent crash
of the ipcamera process.
Impact:
After the crash, the web interface on port 80 will not be available anymore.
Exploitation:
An attacker could exploit this issue by just sending a login request with valid
credentials (such as admin or limited user), but without an user-agent HTTP
header. Default credentials can be used to bypass the credentials requirement.
Evidence:
The disassembly of affected code from an NC200 camera is shown below:
0x0047dca0 lw a0, (user_arg)
0x0047dca4 lw a1, (password_arg)
0x0047dca8 lw t9, -sym.swUMMatchPassword(gp)
0x0047dcac nop
0x0047dcb0 jalr t9
0x0047dcb4 nop
0x0047dcb8 lw gp, (saved_gp)
0x0047dcbc sw v0, (auth_result)
0x0047dcc0 lw v0, (auth_result)
0x0047dcc4 nop
0x0047dcc8 bnez v0, 0x47de34
0x0047dccc nop
0x0047dcd0 sw zero, (arg_54h)
0x0047dcd4 lw a0, (environment)
0x0047dcd8 lw a1, -0x7fe4(gp)
0x0047dcdc nop
0x0047dce0 addiu a1, a1, -0x7cb0 ; "HTTP_USER_AGENT"
0x0047dce4 lw t9, -sym.httpGetEnv(gp)
0x0047dce8 nop
0x0047dcec jalr t9
0x0047dcf0 nop
0x0047dcf4 lw gp, (saved_gp)
0x0047dcf8 sw v0, (user_agent_ptr)
0x0047dcfc lw a0, (user_agent_ptr) ; <== This pointer could be NULL
0x0047dd00 lw a1, -0x7fe4(gp)
0x0047dd04 nop
0x0047dd08 addiu a1, a1, -0x7ca0 ; "Firefox"
0x0047dd0c lw t9, -sym.imp.strstr(gp)
0x0047dd10 nop
0x0047dd14 jalr t9
Disclosure timeline:
2nd December 2019 - Initial vulnerability report for NC200.
4th December 2019 - Vendor confirms vulnerablity but does not start fixing
due to the product being end-of-life.
4th December 2019 - Notified vendor the vulnerability details will be public
and it should be fixed.
6th December 2019 - Thanks for your opinion, we will discuss and write back
to you.
<silence>
7th February 2020 - Notified vendor issue exists on NC450 and possibly all
models in between. Fixed a disclosure deadline in 30 days.
8th February 2020 - Vendor: We will check but please be patient.
18th February 2020 - We failed to reproduce the issue with the provided PoC.
<trying to troubleshoot>
24th February 2020 - Reverse engineered all the firmware images on behalf of
the vendor and notified they were all vulnerable.
2nd March 2020 - Vendor asks to check fixes for NC200.
2nd March 2020 - Confirmed fix. Asked the vendor to do the same on all cameras.
3rd March 2020 - Vendor will check on other cameras, but will take some time.
3rd March 2020 - Asked the vendor to be quick.
9th March 2020 - Notified CVE identifier to vendor, gave extra week to patch.
9th March 2020 - Vendor is testing fix on all models.
13th March 2020 - Vendor asks to confirm fixes.
13th March 2020 - Confirmed fixes and asked the vendor to publish updates.
Disclosure delayed one week to give some time to patch if
the vendor published firmware updates.
29th March 2020 - No updates have been made public by the vendor. Releasing
details to the public after almost 4 months from initial
notification.
