TP-LINK Cloud Cameras NCXXX Hardcoded Encryption Key

2020.05.05
Credit: Pietro Oliva
Risk: Medium
Local: No
Remote: Yes
CWE: CWE-798


CVSS Base Score: 5/10
Impact Subscore: 2.9/10
Exploitability Subscore: 10/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Low
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: Partial
Integrity impact: None
Availability impact: None

Vulnerability title: TP-LINK Cloud Cameras NCXXX Hardcoded Encryption Key Author: Pietro Oliva CVE: CVE-2020-12110 Vendor: TP-LINK Product: NC200, NC210, NC220, NC230, NC250, NC260, NC450 Affected version: NC200 <= 2.1.9 build 200225, NC210 <= 1.0.9 build 200304, NC220 <= 1.3.0 build 200304, NC230 <= 1.3.0 build 200304, NC250 <= 1.3.0 build 200304, NC260 <= 1.5.2 build 200304, NC450 <= 1.5.3 build 200304. Fixed version: NC200 <= 2.1.10 build 200401, NC210 <= 1.0.10 build 200401, NC220 <= 1.3.1 build 200401, NC230 <= 1.3.1 build 200401, NC250 <= 1.3.1 build 200401, NC260 <= 1.5.3 build_200401, NC450 <= 1.5.4 build 200401 Description: The issue is located in the methods swSystemBackup and sym.swSystemRestoreFile, where a hardcoded encryption key is used in order to encrypt/decrypt a config backup file. The algorithm in use is DES ECB with modified s-boxes and permutation tables. Impact: Attackers could exploit this vulnerability to decrypt backup files and get access to sensitive data, such as the following: -Alarm FTP server user and password -Wlan passphrase -PPPOE user and password -Alarm SMTP server user and password -DDNS user and password In addition to that, attackers could forge an encrypted backup file that can be restored via the web interface. This allowed arbitrary files to be written or overwritten with arbitrary attacker-controlled contents. Needless to say, this could result in permanent damage or code execution as root. Exploitation: An attacker would have to figure out the modified DES algorithm in order to be able to encrypt/decrypt config backup files. This is not hard to do with some google search. Once that has been done, attackers can either decrypt backup files or create their own with custom contents, effectlively writing arbitrary files on the device. Evidence: The disassembly of affected code from an NC200 camera is shown below: swSystemRestoreFile: 0x004a0f88 lui gp, 0xa 0x004a0f8c addiu gp, gp, -0x5c78 0x004a0f90 addu gp, gp, t9 0x004a0f94 addiu sp, sp, -0x4f8 0x004a0f98 sw ra, (var_4f4h) 0x004a0f9c sw fp, (var_4f0h) 0x004a0fa0 move fp, sp 0x004a0fa4 sw gp, (var_18h) 0x004a0fa8 sw a0, (encrypted_filename_ptr) 0x004a0fac lw v0, -0x7fe4(gp) 0x004a0fb0 nop 0x004a0fb4 addiu v0, v0, -0x4c40 ; "/tmp/plainBackup" 0x004a0fb8 nop 0x004a0fbc sw v0, (decrypted_filename_ptr) 0x004a0fc0 lw a0, (encrypted_filename_ptr) 0x004a0fc4 lw a1, -0x7fe4(gp) 0x004a0fc8 nop 0x004a0fcc addiu a1, a1, -0x4c2c ; "tp-link" 0x004a0fd0 lw a2, (decrypted_filename_ptr) 0x004a0fd4 lw t9, -sym.DES_Decrypt(gp) 0x004a0fd8 nop 0x004a0fdc jalr t9 swSystemBackup: 0x004a1c54 lw a0, -0x7fe4(gp) 0x004a1c58 nop 0x004a1c5c addiu a0, a0, -0x4bbc ; "/usr/local/config/ipcamera/pBackup" 0x004a1c60 lw a1, -0x7fe4(gp) 0x004a1c64 nop 0x004a1c68 addiu a1, a1, -0x4c2c ; "tp-link" 0x004a1c6c lw a2, -0x7fe4(gp) 0x004a1c70 nop 0x004a1c74 addiu a2, a2, -0x4b84 ; "/usr/local/config/ipcamera/eBackup" 0x004a1c78 lw t9, -sym.DES_Encrypt(gp) 0x004a1c7c nop 0x004a1c80 jalr t9 Mitigating factors: -Almost every camera model has a different hardcoded key. However, this is not hard to find and all cameras of the same model share the same encryption key which cannot be changed. Remediation: Install firmware updates provided by the vendor to fix the vulnerability. The latest updates can be found at the following URLs: https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/nc200/#Firmware https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/nc210/#Firmware https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/nc220/#Firmware https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/nc230/#Firmware https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/nc250/#Firmware https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/nc260/#Firmware https://www.tp-link.com/en/support/download/nc450/#Firmware Disclosure timeline: 29th March 2020 - Vulnerability reported to vendor. 10th April 2020 - Patched firmware provided by vendor for verification. 10th April 2020 - Confirmed the vulnerability was fixed. 29th April 2020 - Firmware updates released to the public. 29th April 2020 - Vulnerability details are made public.


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